



## **CRISIS or OPPORTUNITY? Bolivian Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Response**

By Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta A. Youngers  
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The December 2005 election of indigenous leader and coca grower Evo Morales marked a major turning point for South America's poorest country. Winning 53 percent of the vote, Morales received an unprecedented mandate for change, and he is following through on his campaign promises on a range of issues. Of particular importance for U.S.-Bolivian relations is drug control policy, where **the Morales government's framework – "coca yes, cocaine no" – seeks to distinguish clearly between coca, a plant long used by indigenous peoples for health, religious and cultural purposes, and cocaine, an illicit drug.**

Past efforts at forced coca eradication have failed to yield long-term results and have generated conflict and violence. **As a coca grower himself, President Morales has an unprecedented opportunity to devise a drug control strategy that enjoys significant support within the country, and that could achieve the kind of durable results that have proven so elusive.**

**Indeed, the Morales government is continuing and extending an approach to coca reduction – cooperative eradication – that has been in place in Bolivia's Chapare region since October 2004.** According to the United Nations (UN), Bolivia's 8 percent decrease in coca cultivation in 2005 was driven by a 31 percent drop in cultivation in the Chapare, progress that the UN explicitly credits to cooperative eradication. Reducing coca cultivation in a negotiated, cooperative manner has avoided the major problems that undermined Bolivia's "zero-coca" forced eradication campaigns in the past, when eradication sparked conflict and farmers responded by planting more coca. Morales is extending the cooperative approach to regions where previous governments have been unable to limit coca production. Despite tensions in U.S.-Bolivian relations, the Morales and Bush administrations continue to work together on interdiction efforts and to dialogue on drug policy issues.

**Long-term success in decreasing the amount of coca destined for cocaine production depends significantly on gains in generating improved incomes and quality of life for the Bolivian people.** Towards that end, the U.S. government should:

- De-emphasize short-term eradication targets and instead assist Bolivia in its efforts to achieve meaningful and sustainable long-term reductions in coca produced for the illicit market.
- Provide assistance for economic development and counterdrug efforts as requested by the Bolivian government.
- Provide full funding for the Bolivian government's proposed project for \$598 million in infrastructure development and small and medium business promotion through the U.S. State Department's Millennium Challenge Account.
- Approve a one-year extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which expires on December 31, 2006, as requested by the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

## **The “Coca Yes, Cocaine No” Approach and the U.S. Response**

A highly contentious issue in Bolivia, forced eradication of coca plants – from whose leaves cocaine can be produced – helped fuel the political instability which led to a succession of five presidents over the past five years. Forced eradication in Bolivia’s Chapare region resulted in protests and violent confrontations, and led to human rights violations including illegal detentions, torture, and killings.<sup>1</sup> During this period, eradication far out-paced the provision of alternative development assistance, causing significant declines in the already meager incomes, as well as the health and nutrition standards, of local families.<sup>2</sup>

Since assuming office, President Morales, a coca farmer himself, has sought to redefine the approach to the coca issue while maintaining a firm line on illicit drug trafficking. **The primary pillars of the new government’s strategy are:**

- Continuation of cooperative coca reduction in the Chapare and extension of the cooperative approach into other coca producing areas previously unaffected by forced eradication, while avoiding the violence and conflict that have characterized past efforts;
- Recognition of the cultural, religious, health and other positive attributes of the coca leaf;
- Industrialization of coca for licit uses; and
- Increased interdiction of cocaine and other drugs at all stages of production.

The government also announced plans to confront money laundering and corruption.<sup>3</sup>

Morales named a coca grower and ex-Chapare mayor, Felipe Cáceres, as “drug czar,” deemed by the U.S. embassy as “an excellent choice.”<sup>4</sup> The participation of other ex-coca growers in key posts has given the government greater credibility to negotiate crop reduction. These officials – as well as President Morales – are very aware of the failures and negative consequences of past coca eradication efforts, in particular the hostility generated in affected communities. **The Morales government now has an unprecedented opportunity to devise a drug control strategy carried out in conjunction with local communities and that enjoys social and political support within the country. Such an approach is likely to be more sustainable and more successful, potentially yielding the results that have eluded the “zero-coca” forced eradication campaigns of the past.**

U.S. officials have expressed skepticism about the new Bolivian government’s intentions and policies on a range of matters, including drug control, and express growing concerns about the deepening relationship between the Bolivian, Cuban and Venezuelan governments. Tensions on both sides have flared in recent weeks. In late June, U.S. “drug czar” John Walters told reporters that Bolivia’s “current level of [anti-drug] cooperation is not what it has been in the past, nor what it needs to be to continue reducing the problem.”<sup>5</sup> Just days earlier, a high-level USAID official, Adolfo Franco, testified before Congress that: “In Bolivia, Evo Morales and his Movement toward Socialism (MAS) party have continued to waver on economic policy, democracy and counternarcotics.... The new Bolivian government has, on several occasions, demonstrated inclinations to consolidate executive power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms through the Constituent Assembly and other means.”<sup>6</sup> While U.S. officials claim that they are still following a “wait and see” approach and both governments reiterate that they seek a mutually beneficial relationship, President Morales has remained outspokenly critical of the Bush administration, and U.S. officials have suggested that Washington’s patience may be wearing thin.

At the same time, though, U.S. officials have pointed to continued close collaboration on drug interdiction in particular. **Cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) continues and interdiction efforts appear to be resulting in increased cocaine seizures.** Despite the obvious tensions, to date the Morales and Bush administrations continue to work together on interdiction efforts and have maintained a dialogue on drug policy issues.

### **Continuation of Cooperative Coca Crop Reduction**

The Morales government has continued the pre-existing policy of permitting limited coca production within the Chapare region and utilizing cooperative – instead of forced – eradication. In October 2004, the government of President Carlos Mesa signed an agreement with Chapare coca growers allowing each coca-growing family to maintain one *cato* of coca (1,600 square meters, or about one-third the size of a football field). Under the agreement, any coca grown beyond that is subject to eradication.<sup>7</sup> In addition, coca farmers accepted eradication in the two major national parks in the region. The original agreement was to be in place for a year, or until the conclusion of a study to measure the magnitude of the legal market for coca, the results of which would help shape future coca policy (see box below). The October 2004 agreement put an end to forced eradication, and the conflict and violence that was so often occasioned by forced eradication in the Chapare has become a thing of the past.

Coca growers applauded the agreement as a repudiation of the failed “zero coca” policy. The U.S. Embassy reluctantly accepted the accord, emphasizing that it allowed for continued eradication efforts, now carried out in collaboration with local communities. The greater flexibility demonstrated by the Mesa government, coca growers and the U.S. Embassy provided a viable short-term solution to what had become a chronic conflict and gave much-needed breathing room to seek pragmatic long-term strategies. The one *cato* of coca allowance provides these families with \$70 to \$110 of secure monthly income, an economic safety net which in turn has allowed farmers to better assume the risks inherent in alternative development programs.

Recognizing that the eradication being conducted in the Chapare region no longer risks sparking conflict and violence, in May 2006 the U.S. embassy asked that the Bolivian government withdraw one U.S.-funded police force deployed to prevent road blockades and to provide security for eradicators.<sup>8</sup> **All other anti-drug forces funded by the U.S. government continue to function.** According to “drug czar” Cáceres, “They are all still working – the Joint Task Force, the Ecological Police, and UMOPAR – and they all continue to coordinate with the NAS [Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy] and the DEA.”<sup>9</sup>

#### **How Much Coca is Enough?**

Crucial to future coca policy is a study to measure traditional and legal use. It is currently unclear how much coca leaf is necessary to satisfy the internal demand for chewing, teas and industrial production. Bolivian anti-drug Law 1008 stipulates that 12,000 hectares of coca are legally permitted for traditional consumption. Yet even U.S. embassy officials admit that this amount is merely a “guesstimate.”<sup>1</sup> Since 2002, Bolivian coca growers have demanded an objective study of the demand for coca leaf and other non-psychoactive derivatives. The Bolivian government, coca growers and the U.S. embassy supported this proposal and agreed that the European Union would be the best neutral source of funding for the study. Soon after Morales’ inauguration, administration officials affirmed that their long-term policy on coca cultivation would be based on the results of the study. Negotiations over the scope and methodology, however, appear to be at an impasse. Points of contention include defining the population to be surveyed and the potential inclusion of future consumption of industrialized coca products.

<sup>1</sup> AIN-WOLA meeting at the U.S. Embassy in La Paz. 19 November 2002.



The combined military and police Joint Task Force (JTF) continues to be responsible for carrying out manual eradication.<sup>10</sup> The Bolivian government’s Tropical Economic and Social Development Unit,

UDESTRO (previously DIRECO) negotiates with coca growers' union leaders to determine where and how much coca will be eliminated.<sup>11</sup> In coordination with the NAS, UDESTRO directs, supervises and measures the results of eradication operations.

**On Latest Cultivation Measures, Bolivia Fares Better than its Neighbors**

In spite of U.S. concern that the October 2004 agreement would lead to a dramatic increase in Bolivia's coca crop, officials from the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) noted in November 2005 that there was "relative stability in coca cultivation."<sup>12</sup> **In March 2006, the U.S. State Department reported an 8 percent increase in net coca cultivation in Bolivia from 2004 to 2005,<sup>13</sup> significantly less than the increases that the U.S. government reported for other leading coca producing countries.** The State Department reported a 38 percent increase in land under coca cultivation in Peru, despite continued forced eradication. In Colombia, the only country in the Andean region that allows aerial herbicide spraying of illicit crops, ONDCP reported a 26 percent increase in the area under coca cultivation.<sup>14</sup>

While the U.S. government maintains that Bolivia experienced a moderate increase in net coca cultivation in 2005, **the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) registered an 8 percent decrease in Bolivian coca cultivation in 2005 as compared to 2004.<sup>15</sup>** The U.S. and UN estimates for 2005, while heading in opposite directions, are actually very similar in absolute terms, with the U.S. estimate (26,500 hectares) only somewhat higher than the UNODC estimate (25,400 hectares). Indeed, since the UN began its coca surveys in Bolivia, the U.S. and UN figures have been roughly similar (see charts below).<sup>16</sup>



**UNODC found that the net reduction in land under coca cultivation in Bolivia in 2005 was driven by a steep decline in the Chapare and explicitly credited progress to the October 2004 agreement and the cooperation that has ensued.** By contrast, UNODC found coca cultivation to have risen by 5 percent in the Yungas, which accounted for 71 percent of total Bolivian coca cultivation in 2005. According to the UNODC:

*The decrease at the national level was due to a decrease in the Chapare region, where coca cultivation decreased by 31 percent between 2004 and 2005. The decrease in the Chapare was attributed to the compliance of the farmers to the agreement of October 2004 between the Government and coca growers' federation, limiting coca cultivation to 0.16 hectares per family.*

*Unlike what happened before the agreement, the eradication efforts that took place in 2005 in the Chapare were not followed by a replanting of the coca fields, thus resulting in a net decrease in coca cultivation in the region.<sup>17</sup>*

The sizable reduction in coca cultivation in the Chapare as estimated by UNODC also resulted in a notable decline in Bolivia’s potential cocaine production. Because the Chapare’s coca leaf yield per hectare is considered to be more than double the yield elsewhere in the country, the 31 percent reduction in area under cultivation in the Chapare translated to a 16 percent decline in Bolivia’s cocaine production potential, down from an estimated 107 metric tons in 2004 to 90 metric tons in 2005, according to UNODC calculations.<sup>18</sup>

**Table 1: U.S. estimates of coca cultivation in the Andean region (hectares)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	% change 2004-2005
Bolivia	14,600	19,900	21,600	23,200	24,600	26,500	8%
Colombia	136,200	169,800	144,450	113,850	114,100	144,000	26%
Peru	34,200	34,000	34,700	29,250	27,500	38,000	38%
Total	185,000	223,700	200,750	166,300	166,200	208,500	25%

Sources: U.S. Department of State and Office of National Drug Control Policy

**Table 2: UN estimates of coca cultivation in the Andean region (hectares)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	% change 2004-2005
Bolivia*	14,600	19,900	21,600	23,600	27,700	25,400	-8%
Colombia	163,300	144,800	102,000	86,000	80,000	86,000	8%
Peru	43,400	46,200	46,700	44,200	50,300	48,200	-4%
Total	221,300	210,900	170,300	153,800	158,000	159,600	1%

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

\* The UN coca survey in Bolivia began in 2003, so U.S. estimates were used in prior years.

While lauding the coca reduction achieved in the Chapare, **the UNODC cautioned that ensuring the durability of such reductions in coca will require a more concerted effort by the international community to help Bolivia put in place alternative livelihoods.** In his preface to the Bolivia coca survey, UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa notes:

*Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the world... Sustainable reduction of Bolivia’s supply of coca must go hand in hand with reducing poverty and improving infrastructure, health and education. Farmers need a viable and long-term alternative to coca cultivation. Crop replacement without an effective alternative development strategy will not work. It is therefore incumbent on the international community – particularly cocaine consuming countries – to more generously assist Bolivia to help its farmers achieve sustainable licit livelihoods and to provide greater market access to make agricultural and forest products attractive to farmers.<sup>19</sup>*

**During the first five months of the Morales administration approximately 1,500 hectares of coca were eliminated.<sup>20</sup>** Bolivian anti-drug officials admit that they are “behind schedule in eradication,”<sup>21</sup> but aim to meet the government’s target of eradicating slightly more than 5,000 hectares in 2006. **Cáceres explains that “there is no more forced coca eradication...but we want to comply with (our obligations) to the international community, respecting human rights, without killings and**

**without confrontations between fellow Bolivians.”**<sup>22</sup> During recent talks with the coca growers federations in the Chapare, Cáceres emphasized that the Morales government wants to “accelerate eradication, and urged the continued cooperation of the growers federations as a signal of support for the fight against drug trafficking and support for the President.”<sup>23</sup> On June 22, 2006, the government reached an agreement with Chapare coca growers to increase coca crop reduction to between 20 and 25 hectares per day.<sup>24</sup>

### **Bolivian Government Expands Cooperative Eradication Program to La Paz Yungas**

In addition to efforts to limit coca production in the Chapare region, **Morales is moving forward with agreements in coca-growing areas where previous governments had been unable to limit production.** Bolivian anti-drug law permits up to 12,000 hectares of legal coca in the La Paz Yungas region; however, production has far surpassed that amount in the legal coca growing area and has expanded to areas beyond it. The U.S. State Department has cited unchecked increases in coca cultivation in the Yungas as the primary reason for rising levels of coca production in the country.<sup>25</sup> However, an attempt to initiate forced eradication efforts in 2001 was rapidly abandoned in the face of widespread and vehement local opposition. Many residents of this region have opposed both eradication and alternative development efforts there. In April 2006, USAID chose to withdraw from one section of the Yungas – Caranavi – due to conflict surrounding alternative development projects there.<sup>26</sup>

According to the State Department, Caranavi is “the area with the greatest potential for further increases [in coca cultivation] in that region.”<sup>27</sup> The UNODC reports that the area under coca cultivation in Caranavi was nearly 500 hectares larger in 2005 than in 2003. In May 2006, the Morales government signed an agreement with coca producers in Caranavi where coca production has been considered illegal. Under the agreement, each coca farming family currently affiliated with the growers’ union is permitted to plant a *cato* of coca and is eligible to receive integrated development assistance. In exchange, Caranavi farmers must cooperatively eliminate the rest. **To carry out eradication in the region, the Bolivian government is forming a mini Joint Task Force of approximately 110 members and is requesting U.S. funding for the unit.**<sup>28</sup> Cooperative efforts are scheduled to begin in early July in Caranavi and other communities, and will expand to the Asunta region, pending an agreement with producers there.<sup>29</sup> The accord also allows for the sale of permitted coca in the government-sanctioned market. Previously, Caranavi producers were not authorized to sell at any legal market, pushing production towards the illicit drug market.

In June 2006, the Bolivian government began negotiations with other communities in the La Paz Yungas, such as Irupana, to “rationalize” and limit coca production in the rest of the Yungas. If these initiatives prove successful, they would greatly reduce existing “excess” coca cultivation in the region that has fueled coca production increases in recent years. **Reaching agreements with these communities would not likely have been possible without a government with roots in the coca growers’ federations.**

### **Alternative Licit Uses and Industrialization of the Coca Leaf**

Among its strategies to promote economic development in coca growing regions, the Bolivian government is seeking to expand and develop alternative uses of the coca plant for products such as coca tea, as well as its industrialization. The coca plant has traditionally been chewed or consumed as a tea – *mate de coca* – served widely throughout Bolivia and Peru. The Coca-Cola Company purchases Peruvian coca leaves, extracts the traces of cocaine alkaloids and uses the leaves as a flavoring agent in the world’s

most popular soft drink. More recently developed coca-based products include baking flour, toothpaste, shampoo, wine and various medicinal products. The Bolivian government believes that there is potentially a significant market for coca tea and is studying various other possibilities for industrialization of the coca leaf. **While expanding licit coca uses in and of itself will not be a sufficient engine for economic development of coca growing regions, it could make a significant contribution to providing alternative sources of income.**

At the request of the Bolivian government, the Venezuelan government is providing economic assistance for both the industrialization of coca and improving the living standards of those living in coca growing regions. It is financing at least two factories, one to produce coca flour in the Chapare and another to produce coca tea in the Yungas. Venezuela, Cuba and India have expressed interest in importing coca-based products. In addition, the Venezuelan government is supporting health care and literacy efforts in coca growing regions and the rest of the country. While Venezuelan aid is often cast in negative political terms in the United States, local residents are already benefiting from improved medical attention and access to education.

The Bolivian government has also launched an international campaign to remove the coca leaf from Schedule 1 of the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, where the coca leaf is listed along with cocaine and heroin. This is a necessary step to legally export coca-based products to other countries. Bolivia and Peru have long protested the lack of differentiation between the coca leaf and cocaine in the 1961 Convention. Many scientists who have studied the coca plant point out that it is more similar to caffeine-based plant stimulants, such as coffee, tea, and *yerba mate*.

The Transnational Institute has studied the history of the 1961 Convention and surveyed the evidence regarding the health impacts and cultural significance of coca, and concludes that “[t]here is enough scientific evidence to substantiate the claim that the traditional use of coca has no negative health effects; that it serves positive therapeutic, sacred and social functions; and therefore its classification as a narcotic drug was a mistake.”<sup>30</sup> **Bolivian government officials point out that removing the coca leaf from Schedule 1 would not impact on other parts of the convention related to cocaine and drug control efforts more broadly.** International support for the Bolivian government’s proposal would correct an “historical error” that has resulted in serious negative consequences for the Andean region.<sup>31</sup>

Not surprisingly, the U.S. government has rejected calls for any revision of the 1961 Convention and has expressed skepticism about the potential for significant coca reduction under the new government’s strategy. U.S. officials fear that the more liberal approach could lead to “an explosion of (coca) planting with a corresponding explosion in cocaine production.”<sup>32</sup> The Bolivian government’s efforts to call attention to the positive attributes of the coca leaf, as well as the government’s reliance on coca growers themselves to agree to eradication, run very much against the grain of U.S. counter-drug policy, which has historically vilified the coca leaf and depicts coca growers as the first link in the chain of drug production.

### **Morales Government Sustains Interdiction**

In abandoning the previous “zero coca policy,” the Morales administration has shifted to an emphasis on “zero drug trafficking,” an area where more common ground has been found with the United States. The director of the NAS in Bolivia cited U.S. support for this approach: “For us, the fight is against cocaine, not coca. We know that you have used coca for its medicinal qualities for ages. We just help you fight drug trafficking.”<sup>33</sup> Morales signaled the importance of continued cooperation with the U.S. in interdiction efforts during his inaugural address: “We want to have an alliance, because we are

convinced that drug trafficking is a disease afflicting humanity.”<sup>34</sup> The decision to intensify the attack on drug precursors, production, and transport and money laundering has been assumed by most coca growers as essential to maintaining the right to grow limited coca for legal consumption.

**Despite initial skepticism on both sides, Bolivian and U.S. officials highlight continued collaboration and progress in interdiction efforts.**<sup>35</sup> In March 2006, a high-ranking Bolivian anti-drug police commander affirmed that the Morales government had not restrained interdiction missions and that cooperation with the DEA continues.<sup>36</sup> Another official stated that since the inauguration, “We have not had any problems carrying out interdiction operations. The DEA support continues, with some funding restrictions, but they still give us vehicles, fuel and logistical support. The fight against drug trafficking continues.”<sup>37</sup> Likewise, a State Department official stated in June 2006 that “interdiction is on par or up from past years.”<sup>38</sup>

**Anti-drug officials and the Bolivian press report an increase in drug seizures.** Bolivia’s “drug czar,” Felipe Cáceres, has reported that in four months the administration “has broken all records for cocaine confiscation.”<sup>39</sup> Of course, the number of drug seizures and the amounts seized are open to interpretation – increased confiscations could suggest that enforcement operations are more energetic and effective, but could also mean that more cocaine is being produced. Nevertheless, the Morales administration has to date shown political will to combat the cocaine trade.


## **Conclusion**

The uneasy relationship between the Bolivian and U.S. governments is under increasing strain as both governments send mixed messages about their willingness to work together on drug policy and other issues. Moreover, both sides face pressures from their respective congresses and constituents that could make continued collaboration difficult. Already, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to cut anti-drug aid to Bolivia for fiscal year 2007, citing “a lessening of that country’s commitment to fighting drugs in the region.” However, **continued U.S. engagement in Bolivia, as well as respect for its democratic processes, is important for the development and political stability of South America’s poorest nation.** While the U.S. government will obviously continue to have policy differences with its Bolivian counterparts, U.S. engagement must be predicated on acceptance of the legitimacy of Bolivia’s democratically elected leaders and should be oriented toward seeking common ground on issues of mutual concern. Ultimately, Bolivia’s ability to tackle the myriad challenges it faces will require international support, including from the United States.

**Moreover, if implemented effectively, the “coca yes, cocaine no” strategy adopted by the Bolivian government may offer greater opportunities for success in the long-run.** Increasingly, international actors have recognized the importance of providing viable economic alternatives to coca farmers prior to significant coca eradication efforts. To date, the most successful drug crop eradication efforts can be found in Asia – most notably, Thailand, Pakistan and Vietnam – where governments put into place comprehensive development programs to increase both the income levels and the standards of living of local farmers, which were then weaned from opium poppy production. In each of these cases, eradication efforts were carried out in collaboration with the local community, and within a framework of respect for the rule of law and human rights. Development and law enforcement efforts were kept separate in order to assure the continued support of the local population. The findings of a recent assessment of alternative development undertaken by the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs underscored the importance of drawing a clear distinction between development and enforcement objectives:

*Drug-crop eradication on farms lacking viable alternatives undermines development... Rather than target peasant illicit-crop growers, as in forced eradication, law enforcement should interdict supply lines – of chemicals or processed or semi-processed drugs – arrest and prosecute traffickers, and disrupt labs and financial markets.<sup>40</sup>*

It is too soon to evaluate the impact of the new government’s drug control policies and many obstacles lie in the path of effective implementation. Moreover, cooperative eradication could move at a slower pace than forced eradication and coca cultivation may hold steady or even increase in the short and medium term. However, the cooperative approach offers a greater chance to achieve the kind of durable results that have eluded the forced eradication approach. Forced eradication has delivered impressive results in certain places and at certain times. But the reductions achieved have proven to be short-lived, because of the conflicts and political backlash that forced eradication provokes, and because, lacking alternatives, many farmers replant coca. **Bolivia’s cooperative approach is explicitly intended to avoid the problem of replanting eradicated plants, and has shown early potential. Bolivia could prove to be the first Latin American country to repeat the success found in the Asian countries described above and that has remained elusive in the Andean region.**



**Table 3: U.S. Bilateral Aid to Bolivia, FY2000-FY2007 (request)**  
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 estimate	2007 request	2007 House bill
Economic and Social Aid	159.77	73.33	105.67	109.79	102.72	89.80	88.00	88.80	88.80
Military and Police Aid	49.91	35.32	51.85	53.47	55.07	54.10	62.00	65.00	25.50

Source: Compiled by the Center for International Policy (CIP), Latin America Working Group (LAWG), and Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

The Bolivian government's coca and drug control policies are in their initial phase of implementation. **The international community should give the Bolivian government the breathing room that it needs in its efforts to implement the new approach and evaluate progress based on long-term achievements.** There must also be recognition that success in decreasing coca production destined for cocaine production depends significantly on gains in generating improved incomes and quality of life for the Bolivian people. Towards that end, the U.S. government should:

- **De-emphasize short-term eradication targets and instead assist Bolivia in its efforts to achieve meaningful and sustainable long-term reductions in coca produced for the illicit market.**
- **Provide assistance for economic development and counterdrug efforts as requested by the Bolivian government.**
- **Provide full funding for the Bolivian government's proposed project for \$598 million in infrastructure development and small and medium business promotion through the U.S. State Department's Millennium Challenge Account.**
- **Approve a one-year extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which expires on December 31, 2006, as requested by the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.**

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Between 1997 and 2004, 35 coca growers and 27 police and military personnel were killed; nearly 600 coca growers and 140 military and police were injured. Kathryn Ledebur, "Bolivia: Clear Consequences," in Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 164 and written communication from Kathryn Ledebur, 11 August 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Godofredo Reinicke, former Human Rights Ombudsman in the Chapare, 11 August 2005.

<sup>3</sup> "Evo apunta a la banca para dar con los narcos," *La Razón*, 16 May 2006.

<sup>4</sup> "EEUU respalda a Viceministro de lucha antidroga en Bolivia," *Opinión*, 1 February 2006.

<sup>5</sup> "EE.UU. juzga insuficiente la cooperación antidroga de Evo Morales," *El Deber*, 26 June, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> *Democracy in Latin America: Successes, Challenges and the Future*. Testimony of Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for the United States Agency for International Development, before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, 21 June 2006.

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<sup>7</sup> While the original accord stipulated a total 3,200 hectares of coca could continue to be grown by 23,000 families in the Chapare coca growing region, there are at least 40,000 families. The allowance of one *cato* per family actually results in a total of 6,400 hectares. Both the Bolivian government and coca growers agreed to interpret the agreement as 1,600 square meters per family, and Bolivian eradication forces have accepted this limit.

<sup>8</sup> “La unidad que protegía a los erradicadores no trabaja más,” *La Razón*, 19 May 2006.

<sup>9</sup> AIN Interview with Felipe Cáceres, Bolivian Vice Minister of Social Defense, 5 June 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Although the U.S. government has long promoted the role of the military in counterdrug efforts, their participation in internal drug control operations has been highly controversial in Bolivia. Analysts claim that it violates the nation’s constitution and has led to human rights violations, political instability and friction within the institution. See Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences.”

<sup>11</sup> In these communities, the JTF and farmers measure the permitted 1,600 square meters together and then coca growers allow the force to eradicate the rest of coca on the property.

<sup>12</sup> Office of National Drug Control Policy Press Release, 21 November 2005.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2006, [www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm)

<sup>14</sup> Office of National Drug Control Policy, Press Release, 14 April 2006.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: A survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru*, June 2006, [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html)

<sup>16</sup> By contrast, the U.S. and UN figures have typically been quite disparate for Peru and Colombia. For example, the 2005 UN estimate for Peru was 27 percent *higher* than the corresponding U.S. figure, while the 2005 UN estimate for Colombia was 40 percent *lower* than the U.S. estimate. The largest such gap in the case of Bolivia occurred in 2004, when the UN estimate exceeded the U.S. estimate by 13 percent.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Bolivia Coca Cultivation Survey*, June 2006, [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html)

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> AIN Interview with Felipe Cáceres, Bolivian Vice Minister of Social Defense, 5 June 2006.

<sup>21</sup> “120 militares y policías erradicarán en Caranavi,” *La Razón*, 6 June 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> “Cáceres negocia la eliminación de coca,” *La Razón*, 23 June 2006.

<sup>24</sup> “Evo se fija una meta para la coca,” *La Razon*, 24 June 2006.

<sup>25</sup> For example, the 2006 INCSR notes that, “from 2000 to 2005, there has been an increase in coca cultivation from 19,600 to 26,500 hectares, due partially to the inability of the GOB to conduct forced eradication in the Yungas.” U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2006, [www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm)

<sup>26</sup> “USAID se retira de Caranavi por presiones,” *La Razón*, 21 April 2006; and “Aspectos importantes sobre los problemas de seguridad en Caranavi,” USAID-BOLIVIA 06-0419.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 2006, [www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm)

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- <sup>28</sup> AIN interview with Felipe Cáceres, Bolivian Vice Minister of Social Defense, 5 June 2006.
- <sup>29</sup> “120 militares y policías erradicarán en Caranavi,” *La Razón*, 6 June 2006.
- <sup>30</sup> The Transnational Institute, *Coca yes, cocaine, no? Legal Options for the Coca Leaf*, May 2006, p. 3.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.
- <sup>32</sup> “EE.UU. alerta a Evo de una explosión de coca y cocaína,” *La Razon*, 10 June 2006. Comments by Assistant Secretary of State Anne Patterson.
- <sup>33</sup> “EEUU opta por cocaína cero en lugar de coca cero,” *La Prensa*, 1 February 2006.
- <sup>34</sup> “Morales reitira a EE.UU. necesidad de alianza,” *El Diario*, 23 January 2006.
- <sup>35</sup> AIN-WOLA meeting at the U.S Embassy in La Paz, 23 February 2006.
- <sup>36</sup> AIN interview with Col. Julio Cruz Vera, UMOPAR National Commander, 20 March 2006.
- <sup>37</sup> AIN interview with Lt. Col. Freddy Machicado Villegas, FELCN Commander Cochabamba, 1 June 2006.
- <sup>38</sup> WOLA meeting with U.S. State Department officials, 9 June 2006.
- <sup>39</sup> AIN interview with Felipe Cáceres, Bolivian Vice Minister of Social Defense, 5 June 2006.
- <sup>40</sup> UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report*, March 2005, pp. 3 and 13.